This paper analyses a small open economy that wants to borrow from abroad, cannot commit to repay debt but faces costs if it decides to default. The model generates analytical expressions for the impact of shocks on the incentive compatible level of debt. Debt reduction generated by severe output shocks is no more than a couple of percentage points. In contrast, shocks to world interest rates can substantially affect the incentive compatible level of debt.
Introduction
What generates sovereign default? Which shocks are behind the episodes of debt crises we observe? The answer to the question is crucial to policy design. If we want to write contingent contracts, 1 build and operate a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, 2 or an international lender of last resort, 3 we need to know which economic variables are subject to shocks that significantly increase incentives for default or could take a country to "bankruptcy".
I investigate this question by studying a small open economy that wants to borrow from abroad, cannot commit to repay debt but faces costs if it decides to default. There is an incentive compatible level of sovereign debt -beyond which greater debt triggers default -and it fluctuates with economic conditions. The renegotiation process is costless and restores debt to its incentive compatible level. The model yields analytical expressions that allows us to quantify the impact of different shocks on the incentive compatible level of debt.
One important result from this framework is that shocks to domestic productivity (or output) do not generate sizable fluctuations in the incentive compatible level of debt.
Following a severe output shock, debt relief of a couple of percentage points would restore incentive compatibility. This is consistent with some empirical evidence (Tomz and Wright, 2007) , although most of the recent quantitative models on debt and default focus on output shocks. 4 This result suggests that the literature has been focusing on the wrong type of shocks.
On the other hand, shocks to risk-free 'world' real interest rates are much more important. Debt relief in response to reasonable fluctuations in world interest rates is an order of magnitude higher than that generated by shocks to output. While a change in interest rates from 1% to 2% doubles the cost of servicing debt, a 1% fall in output reduces by just 1% the cost of not repaying. The large effect of shocks to world interest rates on debt default is present in some empirical work (Uribe and Yue, 2006) . The model builds on the literature of endogenous sovereign debt and default (Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) , Arellano (2008) ). One of the key assumptions in the model is that if a country repudiated its debt, it would be excluded from capital markets and incur an output loss. 5 The assumption of such costs is a simple way of modeling the costs that could be imposed on a country that defaults. Debt repudiation might inhibit foreign direct investment and undermine a country's capacity to obtain beneficial deals in multi-lateral organisations such as the WTO. In addition, creditors can threaten countries that might repudiate debt with sanctions such as the loss of access to short-term trade credit and seizure of assets. 6 In reality, however, observed punishment for default is arguably tame and temporary. But that is, at least in part, because debtor and creditors renegotiate the debt and, sooner or later, a new agreement is reached. Although we rarely observe explicit contingent contracts, premium rates on borrowing and occasional debt reduction are ob- 4 For example, Arellano (2008) , Aguiar and Gopinath, (2006) and Yue (2010) . 5 The output cost of debt repudiation, as modeled here, is present in Cohen and Sachs (1986) , Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and Arellano (2008) , to name a few. 6 For a discussion of such costs, see Bulow and Rogoff (1989) , English (1996) , Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) and Tomz (2007) .
served, so contracts are contingent de facto even if not written as such. 7 The possibility of renegotiation makes contracts contingent. 8 Here, I assume that the borrower can costlessly call for debt renegotiation, but lenders have all the bargaining power in the renegotiation stage. In equilibrium, the assumption on bargaining power implies that debt renegotiation simply restores debt to its incentive compatible level. Costs, delays and further debt reductions associated with the renegotiation process might play an important role, but abstracting from them allows us to better understand the effects of different shocks on the incentive compatible level of debt. 9 I begin with an endowment economy, where borrowers' impatience drives debt decisions. Then I move to a model with production, where borrowing occurs due to differences in the marginal productivity of capital. Models with endogenous decision of debt repayment and capital accumulation are not very tractable analytically. However, for some limiting cases, I can derive simple and intuitive analytical solutions for the level of debt and debt reduction ("haircut"). The method consists of taking first order approximations of the Bellman equations. I also solve the model numerically for non-limiting cases and
show that the analytical solutions are good approximations.
The results on debt reduction for both economies are very similar. Debt reduction predicted by the model depends positively on the magnitude of the shocks and the persistence of states. Importantly, the output cost of defaulting, a variable which is difficult to measure, has no significant effect on debt relief as a fraction of the outstanding debt. So the conclusions on the quantitative effects of shocks do not rest on any particular value of this variable.
There are two key differences between the similar results for both economies. First, in the economy with capital, differences in the consumption-savings decisions for different states of the economy could influence decisions on debt and default. However, I show they produce no first-order effects on the incentive compatible level of debt, as they have only second order effects on the value functions. Second, growth prospects influence the level of debt and debt relief, but those effects are not large. The amount of capital influences debt relief in both directions, rendering the result ambiguous. 10 Therefore, the conclusions about the impact of shocks on the incentive compatible level of debt are basically the same in both economies.
Section 2 studies an endowment economy, Section 3 adds capital accumulation to the model, Section 4 contrasts the results with data from the Latin American debt forgiveness under the Brady Plan, Section 5 concludes. Most proofs and numerical exercises are in the appendix.
Endowment economy
In this section, I consider a discrete time model of an open endowment economy that can borrow from abroad, but cannot commit to repay its debts. The focus of the paper is sovereign debt, so all results in this paper are derived from the point of a view of a domestic planner.
11
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived agents whose preferences are aggregated to form the usual representative agent utility function:
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective time discount factor, c t is consumption at time t and u(.) is the felicity function that satisfies the Inada conditions.
I model debt default costs as an instantaneous permanent fall in output and loss of access to capital markets. The permanent fall specifically captures the loss that a country suffers by taking an antagonistic position towards the rest of the world and never repaying a cent of its debts. I denote by γ the fraction of output lost due to default, so output is given by:
if it has ever defaulted
In the model this is out-of-equilibrium behaviour, which corresponds to never observing such action in reality. For this reason, it is difficult to obtain an estimate of γ, but the main results of this paper do not depend on the value of γ. 10 In the numerical examples, debt relief depends negatively on the level of capital. 11 In the standard Ramsey model, the central planner solution and the decentralised equilibrium are the same. However, that is not true without commitment to repay debt. The distinction between the central planner solution and the decentralised allocation is analysed by Kehoe and Perri (2004) and Jeske (2006) . Kehoe and Perri (2004) show that the central planner solution can be decentralised if the central government is in charge of deciding about defaulting or not and taxes capital income to counteract an externality of capital accumulation. The logic behind Jeske's argument is similar and he finds that capital controls may be welfare improving.
The country can issue only one-period debt (d t ). The price of debt is denoted q t .
There is a continuum of risk-neutral lenders that, in equilibrium, lend to the country as long as the expected return on their assets is not lower than the risk-free interest rate in international markets, r * . The price of a bond that delivers one unit of the good next period with certainty, (1 + r * ) −1 , is denoted q * . There is a maximum amount of debt the country can contract that prevents it from running Ponzi schemes but it is never reached in equilibrium.
The economy's flow budget constraint is then given by:
In a stochastic world, the incentive compatible level of debt fluctuates. If debt goes above its incentive compatible level, the debtor prefers not to repay it, but then both creditors and debtors have incentives to renegotiate. I make the extreme assumption that the country can costlessly renegotiate its debt -there are no delays and no punishment.
There is a stochastic state variable s. At the beginning of the period, its value is revealed and the country makes decisions about debt and default. The country can:
• Repay its debt d;
• Default: in which case the output loss is incurred and the country loses access to international capital markets;
• Renegotiate: the debt becomes ad, where a is the outcome of the bargaining process, as specified below. There is no punishment.
Using the flow budget constraint and the expressions for output, and denoting by d F the face value of debt to be repayed in the following period, the value functions associated with each option are:
where d F is the face value of debt and q(d F , s) is its unit price. The country chooses the maximum of them:
The key difference between this and Yue (2010) is that the renegotiation process is costless and instantaneous. Following Yue (2010), a is determined by a Nash bargaining game, where the outside option for the country is autarky and the outside option for the lenders is walking away with no repayment at all. Thus the surpluses for borrower and lenders are:
The level of debt after renegotiation, α(s)d, is given by:
As a only appears multiplying d, the solution for α(s)d does not depend on d.
I assume θ = 0: lenders have all the bargaining power in the renegotiation stage, so the borrower gets no surplus from the bargaining process. Most of the literature following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) assumes that the borrower fully repays its debt provided it is incentive compatible to do so. As noted by Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) , that is equivalent to assuming that all bargaining power lies with the creditors (expost). Here, by assuming θ = 0, I am adding costless renegotiation and maintaining that assumption: creditors are able to extract the maximum incentive compatible payments from the borrower up to the face value of debt, d F .
The recovery rate α(s) is given by:
For θ = 0 , α(s)d is the incentive compatible level of debt, beyond which greater debt would make the country prefer to default. 12 Hence, the country is always indifferent between defaulting and renegotiating, and it is assumed it chooses the latter. 13 As renegotiation is costless, at state s lenders know they will receive at most α(s)d, 12 V pay is decreasing in the level of debt, and V def is independent of the level of debt. So α(s)d is the maximum value of debt such that V pay (α(s)d, s) ≥ V def (s). 13 Alternatively, I am assuming θ is larger than 0, but very small.
Higher values of θ would lead to larger reductions in debt. Owing to its barganing power, the borrower would obtain part of what lenders could lose in the renegotiation process (the full debt, d). In the extreme case of θ = 1 , the borrower would have all the bargaining power and α(s) would be 0.
14 For simplicity, there are 2 possible states, s t ∈ {h, l}, and the probability of switching states is ψ. Pr (
be value functions in the high and low states, respectively, and denote by d h and d l the incentive compatible level of debt in each state such that: If s = h, the expected repayment
Thus if s = h, repayments in the following period are given by
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As lenders are risk neutral and competitive, equilibrium bond prices
Consider the case s = h and s 0 = l. Then, debt will be renegotiated and reduced. The "haircut" corresponds to the proportional fall in the level of debt, Two stochastic versions of the model are considered: stochastic r * and stochastic y.
Throughout the paper, I make assumptions to ensure that the country exhausts its borrowing possibilities: it borrows d F = d h , making debt as high as possible in each possible state. In this section I will assume that β is very low, as is typically assumed in the recent quantitative models of sovereign default. 16 In Section 3, the assumption of a very low β is removed and replaced by the assumption of a high marginal productivity of capital. As in general d F ≤ d h , the results in this paper can be seen as upper bounds 14 As renegotiation is costless, if θ = 1 there would be no borrowing in equilibrium. A model with θ = 1 requires some costs for renegotiating debt. 15 Likewise, if s = l, repayments in the following period are for debt delief following a negative shock, under the assumption that the renegotiation process generates no further reductions in debt.
Stochastic world interest rates
Here, I analyse the contingent debt contract for an economy with fixed per-period endowment, but fluctuations in world interest rates, r * , leading to fluctuations in the price of risk-free debt, q * . The price of a riskless bond in international markets is q * h in the high state and q * l in the low state, q * h > q * l .
In equilibrium bond prices are such that q(d
l , the value functions conditional on repayment are:
, the value functions conditional on repayment are:
The value functions in the following period are those associated with repayment and the level of debt is adjusted to its incentive compatible level.
In case of default, the value function in both states is: 
. Consequently, consumption is given by:
The following proposition establishes the value of ∆d:
h in all periods and states, ∆d is given by:
, the value functions in the high and low states are:
which yields the claim.
Debt relief depends on: (i) the magnitude of interest rate fluctuations and (ii) the persistence of the interest rate process. In the i.i.d. case, ψ = 0.5, debt relief when the state switches from h to l is approximately equal to
In the other extreme, as
, as it has to compensate for all the expected future loss brought on by the fall in q * . Hence, higher persistence implies
The output cost γ has no effect on ∆d/d. It is important to determine the level of d, but it does not influence the ratio between the incentive compatible levels of debt in both states.
Stochastic endowment
In this section, I fix the world interest rates at r * and allow y to fluctuate between y h in the high state and y l in the low state,
Should the country go into default, the value functions are:
An argument identical to Proposition 1 shows that in the "steady state" of the model, the country exhausts its borrowing possibilities, choosing d
all states and periods.
Proof. Consider the case y = y h . If the borrowing constraint is binding and debt is at its maximum level, then:
Analogously:
Subtracting (4) from (3), we get:
Summing (4) and (3) and manipulating, we get:
Substituting the value of γ in (5), we get the claim.
As before, larger fluctuations and more persistent states imply higher debt relief and γ has no effect on ∆d/d.
Contrasting stochastic q * and stochastic y
In order to contrast debt relief in the cases of stochastic interest rates and endowments, we need to contrast the numerators of Equations (1) and (2) Even permanent fluctuations in output would not generate sizable debt relief. The effect of a permanent output fall on debt relief can be found by taking the limit ψ → 0.
In that case, we get
y so a permanent 2% fall in output leads to a fall of 2% in the incentive compatible level of debt.
Fluctuations in q
* alter the cost of servicing debt. Shocks to y change the present value of output losses due to default. Both these changes affect the incentive compatible level of debt. However, there is a great distinction in quantitative effects of shocks to y and q * .
Shocks to y affect the economy regardless of the decision on default. Defaulting on debt does not solve the problem, does not increase the endowment. Low output increases the incentives for default only because the punishment for default is assumed to be proportional to output. Therefore, in order to generate a fall in the incentive compatible level of debt of x%, the expected present value of output (considering the present and all future periods) needs to decline by x%. But that cannot be more than a couple of percentage points. 17 On the other hand, if the country decides not to repay and stops interacting with world financial markets, q * has no effect in the economy. In this sense, default "solves" the problem of high interest rates. As an illustration, if the country finds incentive In general, the results of this paper point to the importance of shocks that have large impacts in the economy only (or mostly) if the country chooses to keep interacting with world financial markets or only (or mostly) if the country chooses to default on its debt.
By affecting only V pay or only V def , those shocks provide larger incentives to "switch to the other value function".
In the model of sovereign default and debt renegotiation in Yue (2010) , the recovery rate depends on the bargaining power of the borrower, θ ∈ [0, 1]. As in this paper, if θ = 1, the haircut is 100%, by construction. This paper corresponds to the case θ = 0, the haircut is given solely by the fall in the incentive compatible level of debt, which is close to 0 in the case of an output shock. Yue (2010) uses θ = 0.72, which means that the borrower gets 72% of the total surplus and, indeed, the obtained haircut is 73%. That does not seem inconsistent with a very small fall in the incentive compatible level of debt.
But if the bulk of the debt reduction is due to the bargaining process, any shock that generates a fall of a few percentage points in the incentive compatible level of debt would also lead to a large debt reduction.
Debt and default in a growth model
In this Section, I introduce capital accumulation in the model. The domestic country borrows because its marginal product of capital is higher, not because of risk sharing or impatience. The assumption of a low β is replaced with β = q * . In the case of stochastic world interest rates, q * fluctuates around β.
The main conclusion is that the impact of output and interest-rate shocks on the incentive compatible level of debt are very similar to their impact in the endowment economy.
The model follows the structure of the previous section, but with capital, k t , depreciating at rate δ and output a function solely of the level of capital, as labour is normalised to 1:
if it has never defaulted
if it has ever defaulted

Deterministic Model
The deterministic version of the model with capital accumulation serves two purposes: it sheds light on the relationship between growth and capital flows, and helps to understand the results of the stochastic model. 18 The value functions of the deterministic model are given by:
and: The following results hold in an equilibrium with no uncertainty:
1. q = q * , a constant. As there is no uncertainty, q = q * if the country will repay and q = 0 otherwise. The choice d 0 = 0 is strictly better than any choice d 0 such that q = 0 because that yields the same amount of consumption today and more production next period (by avoiding the γAf (k) output loss). The no-default condition is
. 18 The study of external debt and default is closely related to the question of why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries. One proposed explanation is that the risk of default prevents larger capital inflows in emerging economies (Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003)). Alternative explanations emphasise differences in productivity (Lucas (1990) ) and question whether the marginal productivity of capital is really higher in poor countries (Caselli and Feyrer (2007) ). Yet, most of the recent work on debt and default building on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) focuses on risk sharing. Cohen and Sachs (1986) present a growth model in which debt is repaid only if it is incentive compatible to do so, but assume a linear production function and have no uncertainty. They also analyse a numerical example with decreasing returns to capital which is essentially the deterministic model of this section. Marcet and Marimon (1992) and Kehoe and Perri (2004) also study economies with capital accumulation. 19 To see this, note that in the optimal plan V pay
, so if the country has already borrowed d 0 and hasn't committed to k 0 , a marginal decrease in k 0 leads to an increase in today's utility that is bigger than the decrease in tomorrow's value. This type of moral hazard problem is studied by Atkeson (1991).
d
max (k, γ) is the maximum level of incentive compatible debt and is increasing in γ.
Since by differentiating the value function we obtain that V pay is decreasing in d and 
. Hence the first best, full commitment equilibrium is incentive compatible.
Using these results, I now derive the path of debt in the neighbourhood of γ = 0. I will detail two observations that are used to derive it.
First, consider k 
Second, from result 4, we know that the value functions when γ = d = d 0 = 0 are identical and have a common optimal level of capital:
Then, from result 3, we always have d 0 = d max and therefore the no default condition will always bind:
Using the first observation, we rewrite these value functions in the form above. Then by taking a linear approximation of V pay (k, d)
and V def (k, γ) around V 0 (k) and manipulating the linearised expressions, we can find d
and γ that equate V pay (k, d) and V def (k, γ) without solving for the value functions. The expression for d turns out to be a good approximation for its true value if γ is not more than a few percentage points. This is because when γ → 0, the optimal choice of capital is independent of the decision about defaulting -which allows us to get the analytical results. As γ moves away from 0, that is no longer true, however the impact on the value function of reoptimising the level of capital due to a 1% or 2% fall in productivity is very small, and so is its impact on the maximum incentive compatible level of debt.
The results do not depend on the functional forms of utility or production, which have only second order effects.
Proposition 4
In this economy, for a very small γ:
1. In steady state:
2. For y t < y * :
and:
Proof. See appendix.
Part (1) of the proposition shows that in the steady state, the country keeps repaying its debt if the interest payment, d * (1 − q * ), is not greater than the output loss, γy * , due to default. The debt as proportion of GDP is, to a first order approximation, equal to γ/(1 − q * ). Positive debt with no uncertainty arises in equilibrium to finance convergence.
If γ = 1% and q * = 0.98 (r * ≈ 2%), the debt-GDP ratio is 50%.
The level of debt is proportional to the output loss and inversely proportional to the risk-free interest rate. Note that a change in interest rate from 1% to 2% has the same impact on d as a 50% decrease in GDP. The intuition for the different impacts of A and q * on the incentive compatible level of debt (Equation 6) is similar to the reasons for their distinct effects of shocks in Section 2 (Equations 1 and 2).
Part (2) of the proposition shows that for y t < y * , the condition for default reduces to a comparison between output losses and resources paid to foreign agents in the present period. But the increase in debt is endogenously determined by considering that the country will be indifferent in the next period between repaying and defaulting -so, ultimately, debt at period t is obtained by backward induction from the steady state level of debt.
For y t < y * , the absolute level of debt is increasing over time because the present value of the output loss due to default is increasing as output rises to its steady state level. The debt-GDP ratio is decreasing over time, because positive capital inflows generate greater incentive for the country to repay, and capital inflows are decreasing over time.
The proposition also shows that in equilibrium the country must experience net outflows of resources on the path of convergence. Debt is increasing (financial account is in surplus) but the increase is smaller than the interest paid on its debt. So, even though the current account is in deficit, the country is a net exporter of goods.
In the appendix, I present a numerical example that confirms the analytical expression is a good approximation for the results and illustrates convergence in this economy.
Stochastic world interest rates
Here, I analyse an economy with fixed technology, A, and fluctuations in world interest rates, r * , which lead to fluctuations in the price of risk-free debt, q * . Except for capital accumulation and the assumption that q * h and q * l are close to β, the model is identical to that of section 2.1.
As in section 2, renegotiation restores debt to its incentive compatible level. Denote by d h and d l the incentive compatible level of debt in the high and low states, respectively,
the value functions are:
functions associated with repayment are:
In the event of default, the value function in both states is: 
When the borrowing constraint is binding, the problem of the country is analogous to choosing debt in each state d h and d l -or to choosing the expected debt repayment d 0 and debt reduction ∆d -subject to incentive compatibility constraints.
The value of ∆d
For analytical convenience, I consider that dq * = q * h − q * l is sufficiently small and work with linear approximations, which implies we are not considering the effects on the value function of reoptimising the choice of k 0 when the country changes state.
In addition, I temporarily consider an alternative process for q * that I denote by the ξ-process, as opposed to the ψ-process that we described above. At time t = 0, q * 0 = q * ξ ; from time t = 1 on, there is a constant probability at each period that q * permanently goes toq. So, for t > 0:
• if q * t−1 = q * ξ , Pr(q * t = q * ξ ) = ξ and Pr(q * t =q) = 1 − ξ;
The value function at (k, d) if q t = q * ξ is:
) and V det is the value function in the model with no uncertainty.
The ξ-process and the ψ-process are related using the following lemma:
Compare the following two cases when q * follows the ξ-process: (1) q * = q * ξ and debt is d ξ 0 and (2) q * =q and debt is d 0 . We want to find the values of d ξ 0 and d 0 that make the country indifferent between both cases in order to determine ∆d using proposition
By taking a linear approximation of
, we get the following lemma:
Lemma 7 Indifference between both states,
is debt contracted at time t if q * t = q * ξ and d t+1 is debt contracted at time t if q * t =q.
Suppose that q * ξ >q. The first line in the above expression shows the utility cost of having higher debt. The second line shows the utility benefit of borrowing at a lower rate, taking into account the probability of cheaper borrowing in future periods, plus the benefit of being able to borrow more due to lower interest rates. If the borrowing constraint is binding, then
which means that the benefit of borrowing an extra unit this period is greater than the cost of holding an extra unit of debt next period.
From Lemma 7, we can write:
It is convenient to consider Equation 7 as we approach the steady state of the deterministic economy. Formally, first I take the limit of small shocks (q * h − q * l → 0 + ) and then I consider the limit of small differences in the marginal product of capital (mpk −r * → 0 + ).
In the limit of small shocks, as k approaches k * , the borrowing constraint stops binding, c t and d t approach their steady state, constant, values, and we get::
And that leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 8 Consider a deterministic steady state around,k,d andq, such that q * h and q * l are close toq = β andq = ¡ q * h + q * l ¢ /2. Then, a linear approximation around the steady state will satisfy
Equation 9
is very similar to equation 1, and for small fluctuations of q * , they are exactly the same. There are two differences between the case with capital accumulation and the endowment economy. One is that, with capital accumulation, the optimal decision on consumption and savings depends on the state, which influences the value function.
But because of the envelope theorem, around the point of maximum, those differences in the choice of k have only second order effects on the value function. It follows that they have no first order impact on the incentive compatible level of debt.
The second difference is that growth prospects have an influence on the incentive compatible level of debt. Proposition 8 shows that in the steady state, debt relief for economies with and without capital coincide. But lemma 7 shows that, outside the steady state, ∆d/d depends not only on the the magnitude of interest rate fluctuations and the persistence of the interest rate process, but also on the current level of capital -and its marginal productivity. The lower is the level of capital, the greater are the marginal productivity of capital and the difference between u 0 (c)q and −β
, which contribute to increase ∆d: a switch to the low state that prevents the country from borrowing is more punitive when capital is lower. A lower level of capital also implies lower consumption and, therefore, higher marginal utilities, so present consumption is more important and higher costs of borrowing in the future are less relevant, which induces a decrease in ∆d.
Lastly, a higher ratio between future and present debt increases the importance of future costs of borrowing, which induces an increase in ∆d. Thus the overall effect cannot be deduced from the formula. In the numerical examples, ∆d is slightly decreasing in k, implying the effect of the borrowing constraint predominates.
The analysis has focused on the two-state case, but the same insights apply if we consider more general processes. The next proposition considers the case of an autoregressive process for q * .
Proposition 9 Suppose that q * follows an AR(1) process:
and V ar(ε t ) is arbitrarily small. If the economy is close to its steady state (k ' k * ),
2 , q * 2 ) for any {q * 1 , q * 2 } close toq and {d 1 , d 2 } when:
whered is the level of debt in the deterministic model when q =q.
Stochastic technology
In this section, I consider fixing the world interest rates at r * and allowing for fluctuations in A. 
The value functions associated with repayment are:
In case of default, the value functions are:
As before, if the marginal productivity of capital is higher than the interest rates (mpk > r * ) and fluctuations (A h − A l ) are small, the country borrows up to a debt limit in each possible future state that ensures it remains incentive compatible for it to repay.
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 5. The face value of debt d F is equal
As before, we need to obtain an expression for ∆d. 
Proof. See appendix. One key external shock was the increase in US real interest rates, shown in Figure 1 (from Dotsey et al, 2003) . In contrast to the 1970's when real interest rates were around 0%, in the 1980's they were around 4%. Such large increase in US real interest rates makes the The Latin American crisis a convenient case to evaluate the model's predictions. the main Latin American countries got some debt relief. As the Brady agreements did not cover all forms of external debt, the figures in Table   1 should be seen as upper bounds (Cline, 1995 ).
In the model, renegotiation is costless, instantaneous and the borrower extracts no surplus from the process. In reality, debt relief came ten years after the shock, and what happened in those ten years had some influence on the final agreement. Despite the delay, it is worth comparing the debt relief prescribed by the model and the Brady agreements because the latter were in fact the relief solution to the crisis. 1 − 1.02 −1 (1 − 2 × 0.10) = 0.178 22 As noted by Cline (1995) , the initial approach for dealing with the problem of debt overhang was aimed both at reducing debt and providing new loans, but "for practical purposes the Brady Plan has been all forgiveness and no new money" (Cline, 1995, page 236 we still obtain
Debt relief according to the model
The result holds for any γ > 0 and is robust to other interest rates processes. Using the auto-regressive process and assuming a half-life of 3 years for the interest rate increase, the AR-1 coefficient, ζ, would be 0.79. A jump in real interest rates from 1% a year to 6% a year would then imply even greater debt relief: ∆d/d = 22.5%.
In sum, the decrease in the level of debt predicted by the model in response to an interest rate increase of the magnitude observed in the data exceeds half the debt relief of the Brady agreements. In contrast, a negative productivity shock would not generate results of similar magnitude. A huge 10% reduction in productivity, assuming an average persistence of 10 years (ψ = 0.10) and world interest rates of 2% a year would imply debt reduction slightly below 1% according to Equation 10 .
Numerical results, presented in the appendix, show that lower marginal productivity of capital (combined with low adjustment costs for capital) reduces the amount of debt relief prescribed by the model, but confirm they are quantitatively important.
Concluding remarks
Recent quantitative models of sovereign debt aim at explaining the recent debt crisis in Argentina using output shocks. However, according to the model in this paper, output fluctuations do not have a sizable effect on the incentive compatible level of debtnothing remotely close to the observed debt reduction of 71%. 23 On the other hand, fluctuations in world interest rates can have a strong impact on the incentive compatible level of sovereign debt.
Given the costs of renegotiating debt, should countries issue debt contingent on world real interest rates? In the case of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980's, such contracts could have avoided 10 years of costly bargaining. However, while the real interest rate shock of 1980 can be seen as a policy decision, other movements on world 23 The negative correlation between probability of default and output does not tell us about causality, because a high probability of default has a negative impact on output of emerging economies through its impact on interest rates (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005 ).
real interest rates might be correlated with variables that affect the incentive compatible level of debt, in the opposite direction. For example, the financial crises of 2008/09 led to lower real interest rates but capital outflows from emerging economies. Indeed, FoleyFisher and Guimaraes (2009) find that policy-induced increases in US rates raise default risk in emerging markets, but the overall correlation between default risk and US real interest rates is actually not positive.
Incentives for defaulting on debt depend not on how much a shock affects the country, but on the differential effects of a shock if the country repays and if the country defaults.
Output shocks affect a country regardless of its decisions on default. In contrast, world interest rate shocks affect the country only if it keeps interacting with international financial markets, so have a much stronger effect on the incentive compatible level of debt.
Other shocks that have an impact on international financial markets could lead to similar effects -for instance, by affecting investors' risk appetite. Fluctuations that affect the country only if it defaults, such as shocks that influence the costs of defaulting, could also have large effects on the incentive compatible level of debt. 24 
A Proofs
While proving the propositions of the model with capital accumulation, I often use the following method and I refer to it as a first order Taylor approximation. Consider the following Value function:
So the values of a, b, c are chosen, which determine the next period's x, y (denoted as a convention by x 0 , y 0 ). Take the function that is to be maximised:
Denote by a * , b * and c * the maximising values of V (x, y) and byã * ,b * andc * the maximising
and (x,ỹ) are sufficiently close, we can take the approximation of the maximand function with 24 Foley-Fisher (2008) applies the method developed in this paper to study the effect of terms of trade shocks on the incentive compatible level of debt, and contrasts the results to data on debt relief for the highly indepted poor countries.
In his model, countries in default are subject to trade sanctions, so shocks to the terms of trade have a large effect on the cost of defaulting. His results show that terms of trade shocks can explain a significant part of the observed debt relief.
respect to the variables to be chosen:
If there is a binding constraint on the possible values of a variable, then its maximised value will be determined by the constraint. Otherwise, the envelope theorem applies and the derivative of f with respect to that variable will be zero.
This method is different from the general first order Taylor approximation: the original function V (x, y) is not a function of the variables with respect to which the approximation is done. This is why the maximand function has to be defined.
A.1 Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose q F < q l . Then the first order condition with respect to d F would have to hold with equality in both states:
But similarly, q * l > β implies q * l − β(1 − ψ) > βψ, so the second first order condition implies
Now suppose q F ∈ (q l , q h ). Again, the first order condition with respect to d F would have to hold with equality in both states:
hich contradicts the assumptions that β < q * l and c l ≤ c h .
A.2 Proposition 4
Proof. The value functions in case of repayment and in case of default are maximised at (k 0 p , d 0 p ) and (k 0 d ) respectively, which means that: 
. Approximate the functions that are to be maximised,
The first order Taylor approximation of these functions around V 0 (k) with
Where I used that since ∂V pay ∂k 0 = ∂V def ∂k 0 = 0 due to the Envelope condition for the unconstrained maximization of V pay and V def with respect to k 0 , their evaluation ∂V pay (k, 0) ∂k 0 = ∂V def (k, 0) ∂k 0 = 0 as well. The optimal consumption with no borrowing, no punishment is denoted
. Using the first order Taylor expansions at points (d, k 0 p , d 0 ) and (k 0 d , γ), we get:
The last part is to show that
If k < k * then the country borrows the maximum level of incentive compatible debt. This debt level makes the country indifferent between repaying and defaulting at (k 0 p , d 0 ):
First order Taylor approximations of
to only k 0 , d 0 and γ yield:
Using this last equation the difference of the original Taylor expansions simplifies to: 
ombining both yields:
As c l t+1 and c h t+1 are similar, that implies:
which contradicts the assumption that mpk > r * h .
If s = l and d F is such that d l < d F < d h , a similar procedure leads to
which also contradicts the assumption that mpk > r * h .
Last, if d F < d l , combining the first order conditions with respect to d F and k 0 yields:
for i ∈ {l, h}, which is a contradiction.
A.4 Lemma 6
Before proving lemma 6, we need an auxiliary result:
Lemma 11 Consider the model with 2 states, h and l, and probability of changing state equal to ψ. Defineq = (q h + q l )/2. In a first order approximation,
Proof. Proof: Comes directly from a Taylor expansion of
We are ready to prove lemma 6.
Proof. First, we need to show that, close to the deterministic steady state (k =k, d =d),
Near the deterministic steady state, choosing the optimal (d 0 , k 0 ) instead of (d,k) has only second order effect on the value function V ξ . As a first order approximation, we can write:
Taking a first order Taylor approximation of
(q h = q and ∆d = 0) with respect to q, ∆d, we get:
As a simple first order Taylor approximation,
so the above approximation can be written as:
Now, note that, as a first order approximation:
the last equality follows from lemma 11. Then:
If ξ = 1 − 2ψ, Equations (11) and (12) imply that
Now, we complete the proof by induction. Away from the steady state, we have:
, then, using lemma 11, we can write:
A.5 Lemma 7
Proof. Subscripts denote time (k 0 is capital at time 0). The superscript ξ for t > 0 means that at time t − 1, when the variable (k or d) has been chosen, q * = q * ξ .
again define the function to be maximised:
and take a Taylor approximation with respect to
Note that as a first order Taylor approximation:
Using these last equations I get:
Analogously, for t > 0 and starting with equal initial debts at both states, we get:
Recursive substitution leads to
we get the claim.
A.6 Proposition 8
Proof. Using Lemma 6 and Equation 8:
Using both equations, we get the claim.
A.7 Proposition 9
Proof. Consider a Taylor approximation of V AR (k, d i , q * i ) around the deterministic steady state (V det (k, d, q)). The borrowing constraint is not binding, so choosing the optimal (d 0 , k 0 ) instead of (k, d) has only second order effects on the value function V AR . As a first order approximation, we can write:
Looking at the middle part of this expression,
Proof. Consider that productivity follows the ξ-process, so that A 0 = A ξ and for t > 0:
The value function at (k, d) if A t = A ξ is:
A Taylor approximation of V ξ (k, d, A ξ ) around the deterministic steady state (V det (k, d)) yields:
So:
which yields:
If d ξ is close to d, V ξ pay (k, d ξ , A ξ ) can be written as:
Out of the equilibrium path, the value function conditional on default is:
where c = (1 − γ)A ξ f (k) + (1 − δ)k − k 0 and V det def is the value function in the model with no uncertainty if the country decides to default.
A Taylor approximation of V ξ def (k, γ, A ξ ) around the deterministic steady state (V det def (k, γ)) yields:
where c d = (1 − γ)Āf (k) − δk, which yields:
Using an argument similar to Lemma 6, if ξ = 1−2ψ and fluctuations of technology are small, The numerical solution is obtained through value function iteration. The state space is discretised using grids for debt and capital but the planner can choose any point in the grid. From Figure 2 , the numbers obtained in this solution are very similar to those from the analytical formulae using the path of y t given by the numerical example. In order to experience faster convergence, emerging economies need trade deficits and, as Proposition 4 shows, that does not occur in equilibrium.
B.2 Stochastic model
In this section, the accuracy of the analytical approximations used in Section 4.2 is checked using numerical simulations. The main results are as follows:
• For mpk > 0.04 = r * l , the linear approximation works well: ∆d/d 0 is around 0.17 • For mpk below r * l = 4%, ∆d/d 0 is considerably smaller. For lower values of mpk, when the state shifts to low, interest rates are higher than mpk, so the country sells capital and could even end up buying high-interest-rate foreign bonds. This might sound unrealistic because adjustment costs for capital would prevent such rapid capital movement. Indeed, the debt reduction ∆d/d 0 for lower values of mpk are sensitive to the assumptions on adjustment costs. Figure 3 shows that when mpk is at its lowest value, k 0 = k, then ∆d/d 0 is around 0.10 with adjustment costs given by (a) and around 0.11 in case (b).
